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RECENT DECISIONS
Testamentary Restraint
on Marriage
In United States National Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P. 2d 860 (Ore. 1954), testator
created a trust for his daughter, income of
which was to be paid to her until she
reached the age of thirty-two, at which time
she would receive the entire fund upon conclusively proving to the trustee that she had
not become a member of the Catholic faith
nor had ever married a man of that faith.
Upon reaching the age of thirty-two, the
daughter sought payment of the corpus of
the trust. The trustee resisted payment on
the grounds that by marrying a Catholic,
the daughter had forfeited her rights in the
trust corpus, and brought an action for a
declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the will provision. The lower court
held the condition valid. The daughter appealed on the ground that the provision was
against public policy. In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Supreme Court
of Oregon pointed out that traditionally a
testator in the State of Oregon is allowed
great freedom in disposing of his property
according to his own religious views and
prejudices. The court stated that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution are not violated by such
will provisions since they prohibit state interference with religion and do not seek to
regulate individual conduct. The court further held that a condition in partial restraint
of marriage such as the provision in question was not unreasonable since the daughter was free to marry a non-Catholic at any
time and a Catholic once she had become
thirty-two years of age.
Although the court was not called upon

to determine the validity of the provision in
the will that the daughter would receive the
funds on her proving that she had not become a member of the Catholic faith, it is
interesting to note that somewhat similar
provisions have been upheld in other jurisdictions. Thus in Magee v. O'Neill, 19
Shand. 170 (S.C. 1883), a condition in a
will making a legacy payable to a child if
she were educated in the Roman Catholic
faith was held valid. The court stated that
it was not against the spirit of the Constitution for a member of a religious denomination "to endeavor by peaceable and legal
means to extend his faith and to influence
his children and grandchildren to adhere to
the Church of his fathers." [Magee v.
O'Neil, supra at 187].
In Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 275
(1884), a condition in a will making the
bequest dependent upon the legatee's withdrawal from the priesthood and refraining
from becoming a member of a church society was held valid by the Maryland court.
[See also Mitchell v. Mitchell, 18 Md. 405
(1862)]. So too, where the testator imposed the condition that the legatee be
brought up in a particular faith, the courts
have held the condition to be valid and not
contrary to any public policy. [Matter of
Lessor, 158 Misc. 895, 287 N.Y. Supp. 209
(Surr. Ct. 1936) (grandchildren had to be
raised as Orthodox Jews); Matter of
Kempfs, 252 App. Div. 28, 297 N.Y. Supp.
307, aff'd, 278 N.Y. 613, 16 N.E. 2d 123
(1937) (grandchildren had to be raised as
Roman Catholics) ].
A Wisconsin court upheld a condition
which required the legatee to attend the
regular meetings of worship of a religious
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group for fifteen years as not being void for
uncertainty and indefiniteness. [Matter of
Paulson, 127 Wis. 612, 107 N.W. 484
(1906)].
Pennsylvania courts have held testamentary conditions calling for adherence to a
particular religion violative of public policy because they are in the nature of an interference with the rights of conscience under Pennsylvania constitutional provisions
which state that "No human authority can,
in any case whatsoever, control or interfere
with the rights of conscience." [See Drace
v. Klinedinst, 275 Pa. 266, 118 Ati. 907
(1922); Matter of Devlin, 284 Pa. 11, 130
At. 238 (1925)].
The validity of will provisions requiring
marriage within a certain faith have been
considered by many jurisdictions. Thus,
several cases have held that provisions in
the will which required the legatee to marry
within the Jewish faith have been upheld
where the restrictions were not unreasonable. [Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 129 Md.
455, 99 Atl. 672 (1916); Matter of Saloinon, 156 Misc. 445, 281 N.Y. Supp. 827
(Surr. Ct. 1935); Matter of Weil, 124 Misc.
692, 209 N.Y. Supp. 779 (Surr. Ct. 1925),
aff'd mem., 216 App. Div. 701, 213 N.Y.
Supp. 933 (1st Dep't 1926); Gordon v.
Gordon, 124 N.E. 2d 228 (Mass. 1954)
(subsequent conversion deemed ineffectual
to satisfy condition)]. In Matter of Petition
of Tanburn, re Will of Rosenthal, 307 N.Y.
715, 121 N.E. 2d 539 (1954), the court assumed the validity of such a provision, but
held that the testator had not included an
appointee of a power within the scope of the
prohibition. If the will contains a provision
prohibiting the legatee from marrying a
specific person, the courts will sustain the
condition. In a New Jersey case upholding a
condition to a gift which stipulated that the

legatee was not to marry a certain girl, whom
the testator supposed had influenced his son
to become a "Romanist," the court said that
a father "may annex to a gift a condition that
it shall be void if his child shall marry a particular person, or one of a specified class, as
a Scotchman, a Papist, or a Baptist." [Graydon's Executors v. Graydon, 23 N.J. Eq. (8
C. E. Greene) 229 (1872), rev'd on other
grounds, 25 N.J. Eq. 561 (1874)].
However, where the restriction, though
apparently partial is shown to be in effect a
general restriction on marriage, the court
will declare the provision void. Thus where
a testator's daughter in order to retain her
legacy was required to remain a member of
the Society of Friends, and the Society expelled her upon her marriage to a non-member, the Virginia court held, that in view
of the fact that there were only six male
Quakers in her town, the condition was
tantamount to a general prohibition against
marriage, and was therefore void. [Maddox
v. Maddox' Adrn'r, 11 Grat. 804 (Va.
1854)].
If a will provision, which restricts marriage of the legatee to persons of a particular faith, also requires consent of guardians,
the provision is valid. [Pacholderv. Rosenheim, 155 Md. 455, 99 Atd. 972 (1911)].
However, where this same restriction that
the legatee may not marry outside the Jewish faith was coupled with a requirement of
consent of other beneficiaries, who would
profit by withholding consent, the court
held the condition invalid because the beneficiaries' interest was an inducement to their
withholding consent, and tended, therefore,
to restrain all marriage. [Matter of Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 18 N.E. 2d 658
(1939); Bayeaux v. Bayeaux, 8 Paige Ch.
333 (N.Y. 1840)].
A Georgia statute [Ga. Code Ann. §53-

JULY, 1955

107] declares restraints on marriage to be
void, except certain specified partial restraints which look to the interest of the
person to be benefited. A California statute
[Cal. Civil Code §710], voiding restraints
upon marriage of persons other than minors,
forbids partial as well as general restraints.
In the Snodgrass case, the court considered at length the contention that testamentary religious restrictions on marriage
were an unconstitutional interference with
freedom of religion, and were discriminatory, under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. The court
rejected the argument, holding that these
amendments regulate governmental action
and not individual action. Furthermore, the
court felt that the doctrine of Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), holding that
restrictive racial covenants were unenforceable since state courts cannot aid discrimination, was inapplicable to the present factual situation. However, it has been
suggested that a decision construing such
testamentary restraints on marriage does
constitute state action, since the court is enforcing the prejudices of the testator, and is
an interference with the right to marry, violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[Crane, Constitutionality of Testamentary
Racial or Religious Restraints on Marriage,
6 Hastings L.J. 351 (1955); see also Gould,
Public Policy Applied to Wills, 41 A.B.A.J.
50 (1955)].
Regulation of Cemeteries
Recently, the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that an ordinance granting municipalities power to prohibit the establishment of
cemeteries within one mile from the municipal limits conferred not an absolute power
to prohibit cemeteries, but a power limited
by considerations of public health, welfare

or safety.
The City of Park Ridge and the Village
of Niles brought an action in the Circuit
Court of Cook County to enjoin the defendants, American Bank and Trust Company
of Chicago, as trustee, and the Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, from establishing a
cemetery on property located within the
prescribed limits. The plaintiffs alleged that
the intended use of the tract would be in
violation of an ordinance adopted in pursuance to Section 23-84 of the Revised
Cities and Villages Act.* Defendants filed
a counterclaim to enjoin the plaintiffs from
interfering with the proposed use of the
property. Relying chiefly on plaintiffs' admissions in the pleadings to defendants' allegations that such use would not endanger
public health, safety or welfare the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit .Court's
decision, declaring the ordinance void as to
the proposed utilization of defendants' land
as a cemetery and granting defendants'
counterclaim. [Park Ridge v. American
National Bank, 4 Ill. 2d 144, 122 N.E. 2d
265 (1954)].
The regulation and prohibition of cemeteries falls within the scope of the police
power. This phase of the police power may
be delegated by a state to a municipality by
means of a statute such as the one in the
instant case. Zoning regulations encompassing cemeteries have frequently been held
constitutional. [Shumaker v. Dalton, 51 F.
2d 793 (M.D. Pa. 1931)].
'Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 24, §23-1. Grant of Powers.
The corporate authorities of a municipality shall
have the powers enumerated in Sections 23-2 to
23-111 inclusive.
.23-84. Establish and Regulate Cemeteries. To
establish and regulate cemeteries within or without the municipal limits; to acquire lands therefor,
by purchase or otherwise; to cause cemeteries to
be removed; and to prohibit their establishment
within one mile of the municipal limits.
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An area of contention revolves around
the requirement that a rule, regulation or
ordinance in order to be a valid exercise of
the police power must be based upon some
consideration of public health, safety or
welfare. In Los Angeles v. Hollywood
Cemetery Ass'n, 124 Cal. 344, 57 Pac. 153
(1899), the court stated that regulations as
to cemeteries may be justified when confined to the limits of a city but unreasonable
and without sufficient justification when put
in operation in all parts of a large town. The
establishing of cemeteries has usually been
successfully prohibited when attempted in
the midst of thickly settled cities or near
dwelling houses. [Pfleger v. Groth, 103
Wis. 104, 79 N.W. 19 (1899)]. A prohibition against cemeteries within half mile of a
reservoir was upheld as valid by the New
York Court of Appeals in a memorandum
decision. [City of New York v. Kelsey, 213
N.Y. 638, 107 N.E. 1074 (1914); see also
Cushing v. Town of Bluehill, 92 A. 2d 330
(Me. 1952)].
It would seem that any consideration reasonably referable to the public health or
safety will serve to justify the existence of
an ordinance such as the one in the Park
Ridge case. However, the weight attached
to considerations remote from public health
and safety and dealing rather with offenses
to the aesthetic sense may not be as firmly
embedded in the law of the various jurisdictions.
In Illinois the Supreme Court has held
that although a cemetery may be objectionable to the taste of an adjoining owner its
use cannot be enjoined merely because it is
offensive to the aesthetic sense. [Village of
Villa Park v. Wanderer's Rest Cemetery,
316 11. 226, 147 N.E. 104 (1925)]. In
Abbey Land and Improvement Co. v. San
Mateo County, 167 Cal. 434, 139 Pac. 1068
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(1914), the court held that even in the face
of a showing that surrounding property depreciated in value because of the presence
of a cemetery such objection merely involved aesthetics and would therefore not
serve as a basis for a police power prohibition of cemeteries. [Cf. Fairlawn Cemetery
Ass'n, Inc. v. Zoning Commission of Bethel,
138 Conn. 434, 86A. 2d 74 (1942)].
On the other hand, in a recent Supreme
Court decision, Justice Douglas speaking
for a unanimous eight man court stated
that:
The concept of the public welfare is
broad and inclusive ....

The values it rep-

resents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within
the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Partly on the strength of this reasoning the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a District of Columbia slum clearing statute over
an objection by petitioners that property
could not be confiscated by the government
under a police power measure merely to develop a more attractive community. [Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954)]. Although the fact situation in the Berman case
is hardly "on all fours" with the state decisions involving prohibitions against the
establishment of cemeteries, state courts
may, in the future, utilize similar reasoning
to broaden the area of justifiable cause for
an exercise of the police power.
In the consideration of all police power
ordinances there is a presumption of validity. Prohibitions such as the one in the case
under discussion will be held invalid only
if patently unreasonable or arbitrary. It is
presumed that the legislature considered all
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circumstances and found that there was a
reason grounded in public health, welfare or
safety. The onus is upon the party seeking
to avoid the ordinance to show clearly the
invalidity of the measure.
The Park Ridge case is unusual in this
regard; the issue in this case was restricted
by the plaintiffs' motion to strike the answer
of defendants which motion admitted the
defendants' material allegations of fact.
Among these were the defendants' allegations that no reason for the ordinance
founded in public health, safety or welfare
existed. Therefore the question involved
here in no way dealt with the sufficiency of
the reason for the ordinance but rather
turned upon whether or not such a measure
could be sustained as an absolute prohibition where it has been agreed that there is
no justifying cause. The court held it could
not.
The Illinois court in the Park Ridge case
expressly overruled an earlier decision of
that court in Catholic Bishop of Chicago
v. Palos Park, 287 Il. 400, 121 N.E. 561
(1918), wherein a similar statute was upheld even without a showing that its exercise was necessitated by some consideration
involving the public welfare. The court in
that case erroneously reasoned that since no
absolute denial of the right to bury, but
merely a limitation on that right, resulted
from the ordinance, the limitation could be
validly effected without the reasons necessary in other instances of police power
exercise.
Peddling Religious Books
In the recent case of People v. Hennacy,
the New York Court of Appeals reversed

Hennacy's conviction for having violated
Article 6 of the Administrative Code of the
City of New York which makes it "unlawful
for any person to act as a peddler, without a
license therefor from the commissioner."
The ordinance expressly exempts those who
sell newspapers and periodicals. Hennacy,
however, in addition to selling copies of a
newspaper, The Catholic Worker, of which
he was associate editor, also sold copies of
his book, Autobiography of a Catholic
Anarchist, on a New York City street. The
Court of Appeals held unanimously "that
the People failed to prove that the defendant
was selling books in the street as a commercial venture." The Court gave no further
opinion but cited the case of People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 46 N.E. 2d 329 (1943).
In the Barber case the defendant was a
member of Jehovah's Witnesses and was
convicted for selling Bibles on the street in
violation of the licensing ordinance of the
town of Irondequoit. The ordinance involved was very similar to the one in the
Hennacy case and the Court of Appeals
there, too, reversed the conviction holding
that it was not applicable to the defendant.
It appears from the above decisions, that
Article 6 of the Administrative Code is
limited to commercial ventures only, and
that the mere fact that the distributor sells,
rather than gives away the literature, does
not make him a commercial vendor within
meaning of the ordinance.
In neither case did the Court discuss or
decide whether the ordinance, if it did apply
to those disseminating their written political
or religious opinions, would violate the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press, speech and religion.

